Low Enrollment Rates in Centralized College Admission Systems: Evidence from Brazil

Camila Comunello (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella) Presenting Gustavo Q. Saraiva (PUC de Chile)

20/11/2026

Motivation

  • Many countries rely on centralized college admission systems
  • Economists often advocate the usage of stable mechanisms due to their desirable properties.

Environment

  • Set of students: \(S\), Set of Colleges: \(C\)

  • Each college \(c\) has capacity \(q_c\)

  • Students’ preferences: \(\succ_s \text{ over } C \cup \{\emptyset\}\)

  • Colleges’ preferences: \(\succ_c \text{ over }S \cup \{\emptyset\}\)

  • Matching \(\mu\):

    • \(\mu(s) \in C \cup \{\emptyset\}\)
    • \(\mu(c) \subseteq S\) with \(|\mu(c)| \leq q_c\)

Stability

  • Definition: A matching is stable if:

    • It is individually rational
    • There are no blocking pairs \((s,c)\)
  • Blocking pair: \((s,c)\) is a blocking pair if \(c \succ_s \mu(s)\) and \(|\mu(c)| < q_c\), or \(|\mu(c)| = q_c\) but \(s \succ_c s'\) for some \(s' \in \mu(c)\).

In other words:

  • No one is forced to accept an unacceptable match.
  • The matching is “justified-envy-free”: if I envy the allocation \(c\) of a student \(s\), \(c\) prefers \(s\) over me.

Student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (SOSM)

  1. Each student applies to her best option
  2. Universities:
    • tentatively accept students
    • reject worst students exceeding its capacity
  3. Rejected students keep applying to the best option that have not rejected them yet until every student either has already proposed to all of his acceptable options or is tentatively matched.
  • This algorithm yields the best stable matching allocation to students.

  • A similar algorithm can be implemented in which colleges are the ones proposing (the COSM).

Student-proposing DA

Results from the literature

  • The SOSM mechanism generates an allocation that:
    • Is stable
    • Is strategy-proof for students
  • These desirable properties, however, cease to hold when many accepted students do not enroll.

Summary

  • Using data from SISU (Sistema de Seleção Unificada), we find that approximately half of students admitted through the Brazilian centralized college admission system do not enroll during the first phase of the mechanism.

  • We show the extent to which this generates instabilities and gives students incentives to behave strategically.

  • We find that the leading cause of low enrollment rates is the existence of admissions off-platform.

  • Students accepted to top choices are more likely to enroll.

  • Students from different states are less likely to enroll.

  • Distortions can be reduced by providing students with more information on enrollment probabilities.

The Brazilian College admission system

  • Students take the National admission exam (ENEM) in November

  • In January they learn their test scores

  • Then they submit their preferences: up to two choices on SISU (the platform)

  • During 5 days students can adjust their choices. At the end of each day a tentative allocation is provided (the allocation is determined by DA). Students receive this feedback and the only reports that matter in the end are the final ones made by students

  • Unassigned students select one of their 2 choices to be wait-listed.

  • Students assigned to their 2nd option cannot be wait-listed to their 1st option.

  • Only public universities participate in SISU, with many choosing not to participate.

The Brazilian College admission system

Translated from Wikipedia (Portuguese)

Students’ choices

  • Like in Chile, students apply to a program (e.g., Business at USP).

  • In Brazil, at least 50% of vacancies are also reserved for Affirmative Action (AA) students.

  • So, when eligible, students may also apply to an AA-vacancy, which we treat as a different program.

Performance of Private vs. Public High Shools

Many admitted students do not enroll

Enrollment rates varies accross regions

Roadmap

  • We now describe how, under the current regime, the Brazilian college admission system incentivizes students to behave strategically.

  • We then discuss some policies that could be implemented to reduce the distortions associated with low enrollment rates.

SISU implements the College-proposing DA, which is virtually the same as Student-proposing DA

  • This result is not surprising, given core convergence results (Saraiva (2021), Kojima and Pathak (2009))

Manipulation of the dynamic phase of SISU

  • But similar to bid sniping in dynamic auctions, students could have incentives to wait until the last day to report their preferences (manipulation via postponing rejection cycles).

Suppose on each period students can only report one option

Small incentives to implement manipulation via postponing rejection cycles

  • But we show that when:

    • Students have short preference lists,
    • The market is large, and
    • Preferences are perfectly heterogeneous,

    The probability that students have incentives to wait until the last minute to report their preferences converges to zero.

  • But there is another type of manipulation (manipulation via cutoffs): a group of high-scoring students applies to a program only to inflate its cutoff. The inflated cutoff discourages other students from applying. On the last day, the group switches to the programs they really want, and a lower-scoring friend who knew the plan takes the vacated seat.

Manipulation via cutoffs

  • But if this type of manipulation was widespread, we would observe more programs from which the cutoff grades increase

Straightforward behavior

  • Therefore, students probably engage in straightforward behavior during the dynamic phase.

  • But students need to gather information on enrollment probabilities in order to effectively engage in adjusted straightforward behavior.

Straightforward Behavior

Students could, in theory, have incentives to manipulate the assignment from other students

If student \(s_1\) reported \(c_1\) as his first choice

How students can benefit from manipulating the placement from others?

  • In the previous example, a student could improve her chances during the waiting list by making other students worse off and, thus, less likely to enroll.

  • It is, however, also possible that a student may benefit by making other students better off, as doing so could change the configuration of students who get matched to their acceptable choices.

Matching under truthful reporting:

Matching if student \(s_1\) reported \(c_1\) as unacceptable:

Students are bossy in the SOSM but not in the COSM

When the market is large and we restrict the strategy space from students, very few students are bossy in the SOSM

Bossiness in SISU

  • In SISU, very few students would have incentives to implement a dropping strategy to explore the bossy nature of the SOSM.

Incentives to choose only one option

Incentives to choose only one option

Incentives to misreport by unassigned students

Driving forces of no-enrollment: Descriptive statistics

Cutoff grades and enrollment rates

Affirmative action and enrollment rates

Regressions (linear probability)

Probability of dropping out

Probability of having documentation rejected

Questionable marketing strategies

  • Some high schools have been sued for misleading advertising.

  • Basically, some high schools that have entrances on 2 different roads can create 2 different CNPJ’s (Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas) using these different addresses.

  • They then pool their best students into one of these addresses, and rely on this technicality to market a higher average performance on ENEM.

Flagging suspicious schools

  • We flag private high schools that engage in this strategy by looking at school names, and checking for similarity in their names.

  • If two private high schools with similar names were sufficiently close to one another (400m), both schools were flagged as suspicious.

  • In total, 37 private high schools were flagged.

Performance on ENEM from “flagged schools”

Regressions for Private Schools only

Possible solutions

  • Several policies should be implemented in parallel to address these issues (e.g., allow private universities to participate in the centralized mechanism).

  • In this presentation I will focus in one policy: providing students to better access of information on admission probabilities.

  • As seen earlier, the distortions from low enrollment rates could be mitigated if, during the dynamic phase, students had access to data that allowed them to engage in an adjusted straightforward behavior, where they ignore students to calculate adjusted cutoff grades.

  • We will see that providing this information to students is feasible.

Easier access to Historical data

  • SISU could create an app with historical data on cutoff grades after the waiting list phase

Sketch of the theoretical model

  • The proof is similar to the one provided in Bó and Hakimov (2022).

  • Students have a threshold: if an option in the centralized mechanism falls below this threshold, the student does not enroll.

  • Students, however, attempt to get the best possible match in the centralized mechanism, even if it involves choosing options that fall below their threshold (this is because better outside options may not be known at the time).

  • The platform informs students about these students who do not enroll, who are then treated as “phantoms”.

App with AI predictions

  • But we can actually do better than that: we can use feedforward neural nets to predict whether a student will enroll or not.

  • While our predictions for enrollment for each individual student are not very accurate, once we aggregate the probabilities of enrollment for each program we can get more accurate estimates regarding how many vacancies will actually be filled.

ROC curve and Area Under the Curve (AUC)

Enrollment predictions per program

App to help students make better decisions

  • A version of the following app could be provided to students to help them make more accurate predictions about program attainability:

  • In the limit, if students can perfectly predict how many spots will actually be taken, the final allocation should be stable.

Conclusion

  • Low enrollment rates plague the Brazilian college admission system, generating instabilities and giving students incentives to behave strategically

  • The main culprit are off-platform enrollments

  • One policy that could effectively mitigate this issue is the provision of better information by the matchmaker

  • AI applied in conjunction with students’ microdata (e.g., whether students are currently enrolled) could substantially reduce justified-envy.

  • Private Universities should be allowed and given incentives to participate in the centralized mechanism (e.g., provision of scholarships).

  • Because students accepted to lower options are less likely to enroll, changing the mechanism to a standard unrestricted one-shot DA could be catastrophic.

Thank You!


Gustavo Q. Saraiva

📧


References

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